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In 2005, then newly appointed U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff established a new emphasis for his agency. Concerned 
that responses to natural and man-made 
hazards had been ad hoc, inconsistent, 
and disorganized, he called for a risk-
based approach. Rather than react to 
threats, or prioritize hazards based on 
probabilities or worst-case scenarios, he 
committed to integrating threat, vulner-
ability, and consequences into a com-
bined, easily comparable metric of risk 
[1]. To many in the risk analysis commu-
nity, this was welcome news, consistent 
with the growing notion that risk analy-
sis can improve a broad range of societal 
decisions. To others, though, it was cause 
for concern. 
From its origins helping wealthy Lon-
doners estimate how much to invest in 
sending ships through seas “where there 
be dragons,” risk analysis now appears 
in contexts spanning individual health, 
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military planning, electricity production, and par-
lor games. We are regularly asked to “consider the 
risks,” whether they come from imported foods, 
novel medicines, high school fertility education pro-
grams, or the release of carbon di-
oxide from fossil fuels. We are often 
told that we worry too much about 
one thing or too little about another, 
given the real risks involved. 
Advocates of particular technol-
ogies often implore us to consider 
risks in context. It is irrational to 
reject genetically modified crops 
that can feed the world’s hungry 
and starving. Nuclear power will 
save us from climate change, and 
nuclear weapons will maintain our freedom. Yes, 
they say, there are risks, but these are more than 
offset by the benefits. 
Opponents of those technologies likewise rely 
on risk information. Nuclear power presents an un-
acceptable risk; we should avoid both it and fossil 
fuels. Nuclear weapons threaten life on Earth and 
undermine freedom. Genetically modified crops 
are poorly understood and threaten both democracy 
and small farmers’ livelihoods. Each side in these 
issues concludes that the other is irrational, ignor-
ing what science has to tell us about these trivial/
devastating risks. 
Presumably, risk analysis could help us with these 
dichotomous choices. At its best, risk analysis pro-
vides a systems perspective on complex decisions: we 
can estimate the probabilities that various bad things 
will happen, how bad those things are, and how much 
good will come from accepting those risks. The un-
spoken assumption is that, if we get the numbers right, 
the decision about nuclear power, nuclear weapons, or 
genetically modified crops, will be obvious. 
The harder one looks at “risk,” however, the more 
ephemeral it becomes. Population risk may help us 
think about the number of lost lives, cargoes, or 
other units that we should expect to associate with 
some offsetting benefit. But at the individual level, 
probabilistic statements lose any meaning. A captain 
will or will not lose his ship and crew to dragons on 
a given voyage. A person will or will not get cancer 
from a particular radiological exposure. Some frac-
tion of the population may be more susceptible to 
disease than others, and we may or may not know 
which fraction. 
Further, as we learn more about how individuals 
choose and process information, we find an even more 
uncertain role for calculated risks. An individual’s 
preference for a particular risk/benefit tradeoff can 
depend, for example, on whether he is angry or happy 
at the time he makes the decision [2]. Preferences can 
be changed by irrelevant information, or by different 
framings of a particular piece of information. Describ-
ing a chance as “one in one thousand” leads to differ-
ent choices than does describing the same chance as 
“0.001” or “one tenth of one percent” 
[3]. A choice described as “purchasing 
insurance” is more appealing than the 
identical choice described as “taking a 
gamble” (see, generally, [4]).
It often matters to people as well 
how they lose things. A family may 
take comfort when a 20 year old son 
dies trying to save a busload of school 
children, but would suffer greatly if 
that same son were killed by a stray 
bullet shot into the air by an unknown 
neighbor on New Year’s Eve. A millionaire might 
feel more acutely the theft of the first dollar bill she 
earned than that of a random twenty dollar bill from 
her wallet. And as casinos know well, it can take 
several hours or even days before winnings become 
accepted as part of the winner’s portfolio—and un-
til it is “hers,” she is more likely to stake or spend 
it. Lives may not be commensurable with lives, nor 
dollars with dollars. 
These could be thought of as evidence of indi-
vidual irrationality, for which the remedy is more 
skillfully calculated risk analysis. Such a strategy, 
however begs the question: which preference is the 
“real” one? The angry choice or the happy one? That 
associated with 0.001 or one in one thousand? Insur-
ance or gamble? The heroic or the random death? To 
use risk analysis to make a decision, we must know 
what the preferred decision is. We often do not…and 
it may not even exist. 
Moreover, one’s preference for (or opposition to) 
a technology can shape whether one believes it im-
poses risks [5]. Advocates of nuclear power are often 
as confident that small doses of radiation are harm-
less — or even beneficial — as opponents are that ra-
diation is dangerous at any level. Each side points to 
those studies that confirm its beliefs, and dismiss as 
junk science those that contradict them. In this, they 
are no different from most people on most issues — 
they seek affirming information and ignore the rest. 
And they dismiss those who disagree with them as 
irrational or antiscientific.
Engineers and actuaries define risk in computa-
tional terms, typically as the combined probability 
and consequence of some event. Anthropologist 
Mary Douglas countered that to most people risk is 
more closely related to the idea of sin [6]. To be put 
at risk, she argues, is a modern equivalent of being 
sinned against. Yet another perspective comes from 
sociologist Anthony Giddens, who equates risk with 
the absence of trust [7]. We feel at risk when those 
risk analysis now 
appears in contexts 
spanning individual 
health, military 
planning, electricity 
production, and 
parlor games.
12  | IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE  |  FALL 2008
 institutions we trusted to keep us safe fail to do so 
— or even if we stop believing that they will do so. 
Gidden’s perspective certainly explains American 
attitudes about flying much better 
than does expected value calcula-
tion: flying was far safer on Septem-
ber 21, 2001, than it had been on the 
morning of September 11, 2001. But 
that hardly suggests irrationality 
among those who were more anx-
ious about flying on the later date!
At a recent Native American Forum 
on Nuclear Issues, a representative 
from the Nuclear Energy Institute put 
up a slide saying that nuclear power in 
the United States has generated “only 
a small amount” of nuclear waste, enough “to cover a 
single football field approximately 7 yards deep” [8]. 
Anti-nuclear activists in the crowd gasped at this enor-
mous quantity. Both sides agreed that the number was 
valid. The unspoken question — which well represents 
the chasm between these two cultures — is “what, if 
any, amount is acceptable.” To the nuclear industry, 
however much has been generated is obviously trivial. 
To opponents, none should have been generated, and 
any is too much. It is, therefore, pointless for either side 
to argue that knowing the actual amount — however 
precisely we can measure it — can help us decide what 
to do with it. Yet those arguments persist. 
The examples and conditions above suggest that 
perhaps the biggest shortcoming of risk analysis is 
that too often it fails to ask the fundamental question 
“what is important to us?” Risk analysis — like any 
analysis — is a tool. It can provide helpful, albeit of-
ten uncertain, ambiguous, and incomplete, answers to 
such questions as “how much property damage will 
be caused for each 1000 teenage white males in Las 
Vegas next year?” And “how many lost lives should 
we expect if we run a 1-GW nuclear power plant for 
40 years?” 
But risk analysis cannot tell us, and nor should 
we ask it, how much property damage we should 
allow teenage drivers to cause, whether we should 
pursue a doubling of nuclear power, or whether it is 
right to send sailors to be eaten by dragons. These 
choices we should make carefully, and openly, 
leaving dumb analysis as a servant. If we decide 
that it is acceptable to lose every tenth ship to 
dragons, then we can use risk analysis to deter-
mine whether we expect to lose every fifth ship or 
every twentieth ship.
This special issue of IEEE Technology and So-
ciety Magazine explores the ragged role for risk 
analysis in several technology-intensive public is-
sues. Three articles — those by Bales, Briggs and 
Carr — look at the occasionally explicit but more 
often implicit tradeoffs between risks 
to public health and risks to national 
security. They find that individual 
and institutional perspectives can 
lead to different interpretations of 
ambiguous data, credibility of pur-
veyors of risk information, and ac-
ceptability of risks. Sims and Henke 
explore how a tight-knit and highly 
technical culture can shift under ex-
ternal pressure. Smith’s work takes 
him to low lying Pacific islands, 
many now threatened by something 
scarier than the dragons once thought to dwell in 
the area: climate change and sea level rise. His 
article provides us with a field researcher’s sense 
of what social, cultural, logistical and geographic 
hurdles a large, developed country should expect 
when providing vulnerability relief to small island 
nations. All five papers share the perspective that 
attitudes toward risk are strongly shaped by social 
context, and that understanding context can help us 
understand how risk decisions are made, and there-
by how to make them better.
Sadly, this issue contains no articles concerning 
dragons. Then again, perhaps it does...
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